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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1930s, the northeastern portion of Minnesota
started to experience economic decline as iron mines were being
depleted.' In response, the Minnesota Legislature in 1941 created
the Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board ("the Board"
or "IRRRB") and the office of "the Commissioner" of the Board.!
The primary purpose of the Board was, and is, to use its budget "in
the development of the remaining resources of the [counties] and
in the vocational training and rehabilitation of its residents ....
This includes the promotion of tourism. The area served by the
IRRRB came to be known as the "Taconite Tax Relief Area"; a geo-
graphical region encompassing approximately 13,000 square miles,
comprising most of the area commonly known as the "Arrowhead
Region," and including the following cities: Babbitt, Crosby-
Ironton, Eveleth, Ely, Grand Marais, Grand Rapids, Hibbing, Silver
Bay, Two Harbors, and Virginia.5
The Board's mission has remained consistent throughout its
1. See WILLIAM E. LASS, MINNESOTA- A HISTORY 256-57 (2d ed. 1998).
2. See 1941 Minn. Laws ch. 544, § 4.
3. MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1(3) (1998); 1941 Minn. Laws ch. 544, § 4.
4. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1(3).
5. See IRON RANGE RESOURCES AND REHABILITATION BOARD, 1997-98 BIENNIAL
REPORT 4 fig.1.0 (1999); Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board, About
IRRRB (visited Nov. 27, 1999) <http://www.irrrb.org/>.
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history. It describes its mission as follows:
First, to be careful custodians of the public money entrusted to
it. Second, to enhance the economic vitality of the Taconite Tax
Relief Area through value-driven, cost-effective projects and pro-
grams designed for the long-range benefit of the region.
6
The Board is an important public agency, serving a large geo-
graphic portion of the state and handling millions of tax dollars
each year. At the end of its 1998 fiscal year, it had at its disposal
approximately $69,216,000.00, and at the end of its 1997 fiscal year,
it had approximately $79,440,000.00. 7 The largest source of reve-
nue for the Board is obtained through a tax on taconite produc-
tion, although it does receive significant revenue through invest-
ments, bonds, loans and other sources.8 Additionally, in its 1998
fiscal year it had $31,990,000.00 in expenditures, and
$37,794,000.00 in expenditures in 1997.9 Most of the Board's ex-
penditures are in the area of programs, although it also makes ex-
penditures in the areas of facilities and administrative services. 10
This article analyzes both the constitutionality and the eco-
nomic efficiency and effectiveness of the governance structure of
6. See id. at 4.
7. See id. app. I.
8. See id. For example, in the 1998 fiscal year the Board received
$17,657,000.00 from taconite production taxes, $7,785,000.00 from investments,
$2,502,000.00 in loan revenues, and $3,478,000.00 in departmental revenue. See
id.
9. See id.
10. See id. For example, in the 1998 fiscal year the Board made expenditures
in the following areas:
Programs
Business Development $5,618,000.00
Community Development 11,575,000.00
Taconite Assistance 6,578,000.00
Communications 209,000.00
Tourism 751,000.00
Research and Planning 705,000.00
Facilities
Giants Ridge Golf and Ski Resort $5,066,000.00
Ironworld Discovery Center 2,301,000.00
Mineland Reclamation 916,000.00
Trails 408,000.00
Maintenance/Shop 521,000.00
Building Demolition 247,000.00
Facilities Improvements 228,000.00
Administrative Services $1,541,000.00
3
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the IRRR Board and Commissioner. The article concludes the
delegation of executive power to the IRRR Board, consisting almost
entirely of legislators, is unconstitutional. The article also con-
cludes that the existing governance structure is not effective in
reaching the goals of the legislature. Finally, the article makes rec-
ommendations on how the executive and legislative branches can
most effectively correct the deficiencies. The article is divided into
four parts. Part II outlines the mission of the Board and Commis-
sioner, and Part III outlines the governance structure of the
agency. Part IV identifies management challenges for the agency.
Part V considers opportunities for organizational and operational
improvements and makes recommendations on how the executive
and legislative branches can most effectively correct such deficien-
cies.
II. THE MISSION OF THE IRRR BOARD AND COMMISSIONER
While the legislature and the Board have defined the Board's
mission in broad terms," its mission is essentially guided by the
statutory provisions governing its finances. The legislature has cre-
ated a number of revenue sources for the Commissioner and the
Board, and each source has its own objectives.
A. The Board Account
With respect to appropriations to the Board from the taconite
tax under section 298.28, subd. 7 ("Board Account"), the Commis-
sioner may use the appropriation: (a) to develop the remaining re-
sources of counties in the Taconite Tax Relief Area, including the
promotion of tourism;12 (b) to provide vocational training and re-
habilitation to residents of those counties;'3 and (c) to foster eco-
nomic development and tourism within the Giants Ridge recrea-
tion area.14 No part of the fund may be used for private loans toprivate businesses without governor approval. 5
11. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1(3) (1998).
12. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1(3).
13. See id.
14. See id. § 298.22, subd. 7.
15. See id.
1206 [Vol. 25
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B. The Environmental Fund Account I
With respect to appropriations under section 298.28, subd. 11
and section 298.227 to the taconite environmental protection fund
("Environmental Fund Account I"), the Commissioner shall admin-
ister the fund: (a) to investigate environmental issues; (b) to re-
claim, restore, or reforest minelands; (c) to assist local economic
development projects; and (d) to monitor mineral industry related
health problems among mining employees.
16
C. The Environmental Fund Account II
With respect to appropriations under both section 298.28,
subd. 9b and section 298.2961 to the taconite environmental pro-
tection fund ("Environmental Fund Account II"), section 298.2961
authorizes the Board to use these funds for grants or loans to pro-
ducers for either environmentally unique reclamation projects or
certain pit or plant expansions or modernizations. 7
D. The Economic Development Fund Account I
With respect to appropriations under section 298.28, subd. 9a
to the taconite economic development fund ("Economic Develop-
ment Fund Account I"), section 298.227 provides that the Board
shall hold such funds for each producer, to be used for acquisition
of equipment and facilities for the producer or for research and
development in Minnesota on new mining technology.
8
E. The Economic Development Fund Account II
With respect to appropriations under section 298.2213 to the
Northeast Minnesota economic development fund ("Economic De-
velopment Fund Account II"), the Commissioner may use the
money for projects that create and maintain skilled employment
and encourage diversification of the economy.19
16. See id. § 298.223 (1998).
17. See id. § 298.2961 (1998).
18. See id. § 298.227 (1998).
19. See id. § 298.2213, subd. 2 (1998).
1207
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F The Economic Protection Trust Account
With respect to appropriations under section 298.28, subd. 9
and 11 to the Northeast Minnesota economic protection trust fund
("Economic Protection Trust Account"), the Board and the Com-
missioner may, until January 1, 2002, use the trust's investment re-
turns,20 and subsequently, the trust itself, to approve projects for
economic rehabilitation and diversification of industrial enterprises
in the Taconite Tax Relief Area. Such projects must create addi-
tional long-term employment.
21
G. Tax Increment Financing Power
The Commissioner is also given tax increment financing power
for economic development projects within the Taconite Tax Relief
Area.22
III. THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE IRRR BOARD AND
COMMISSIONER
A. Statutory Analysis
The Minnesota Legislature established the Board and Com-
missioner in 1941 under Minnesota Statutes chapter 298. Section
298.22, subd. 1 currently provides, "The governor shall appoint the
commissioner of the iron range resources and rehabilitation under
section 15.06. ",21 Section 15.06 "applies to the following depart-
24ment or agencies," and lists the IRRR Commissioner as an agency.
The section sets forth the terms of office and general management
21powers of commissioners and deputy commissioners.
Section 298.22 also creates an "iron range resources and reha-
bilitation board., 26 Up to the 1999 legislative session, the board was
to consist "of eleven members, five of whom shall be state senators
appointed by the subcommittee on committees of the rules com-
20. There are several exceptions to this general restriction outlined in Min-
nesota Statutes section 298.296, subd. 2. See MINN. STAT. § 298.296, subd. 2
(1998).
21. See id. §§ 298.292, .296.
22. See id. § 298.2211, subd. 1 (1998).
23. Id. § 298.22, subd. 1 (1998).
24. Id. § 15.06, subd. 1 (1998).
25. See id. § 15.06.
26. Id. § 298.22.
1208 [Vol. 25
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mittee of the senate, and five of whom shall be representatives, ap-
pointed by the speaker of the house of representatives," for two
year terms.2 "The 11th member of said board shall be the commis-
sioner of natural resources .... ,,28 In the 1999 session, the legisla-
ture expanded section 298.22 to provide for thirteen members,
consisting of five state senators, five representatives, and three non-
legislators who reside in the Taconite Tax Relief Area.29 The senate
majority leader, the Speaker of the House, and the Governor each
appoint one of the nonlegislator board members.0 Section 298.22
also provides that at least a majority of the legislative members of
the board shall be elected from state senatorial or legislative dis-
tricts in which over fifty percent of the residents reside within the•31
Taconite Tax Relief Area.
With respect to the allocation of power between the Commis-
sioner and the Board, chapter 298 has different language for each
account listed in Part II above.
1. The Board Account
Section 298.22, subd. 1 provides that the Commissioner "may
use whatever amounts of the appropriation that are deemed neces-
sary and proper in the development of the remaining resources of
each county and in the vocational training and rehabilitation of its
residents." 2 All other subdivisions of section 298.22 grant specific
powers to the Commissioner, except subdivision 6, which provides,
"The board may acquire an equity interest in any project for which
it provides funding."
3 3
Prior to 1995, section 298.22, subd. 2 provided:
All expenditures and projects made by the commission-
ers.., shall first be submitted to said.., board which shall
recommend approval or disapproval or modification of expendi-
tures and projects for rehabilitation purposes as provided
by this section, and the method, manner, and time of
payment of all said funds proposed to be disbursed shall
27. Id. § 298.22, subd. 2.
28. Id.
29. See Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 223, art. 2, § 42, 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1205 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 298.22).
30. See id.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1(2) (1998).
32. Id. § 298.22, subd. 1.
33. Id. § 298.22, subd. 6.
1209
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first be approved or disapproved by said board. 4
A 1949 Opinion of the Attorney General advised that when the
Commissioner proposes a project or expenditure and submits it to
the Board for approval or disapproval, and the Board disapproves
of either the proposed project or expenditure, the Commissioner,
"Nevertheless has authority to proceed with the project or expendi-
ture, since the Board exercises advisory powers only."
3 5
There is a redundancy in original language of this provision,
both before and after the 1995 amendments. Prior to 1995, the
first clause required that all "expenditures and projects" shall first
be submitted to the Board for its recommendation and the second
clause required "the method, manner, and time of payment of all
said funds proposed to be disbursed shall be first approved or disap-
proved by said board."3 6 The word "expenditure" means disburse-
mentf' The Attorney General in 1949 apparently read the first
clause creating Board advisory powers on expenditures to trump
the second clause requiring prior board approval of the method,
manner, and time of disbursements.
In 1995, the legislature amended section 298.22, deleting the
language "which shall recommend approval or disapproval or
modification," and substituting "for approval by at least eight board
members. 38 The 1999 amendment reduces the necessary votes for
approval to "a majority of the board."39 The 1995 amendment
dramatically reallocated power between the Commissioner and the
Board with respect to the Board Account. Prior to 1995, the Board
had advisory powers to the Commissioner. The 1995 language, by
requiring that the Commissioner first submit all expenditures and
projects for Board approval makes the Commissioner to a substan-
tial degree advisory to the Board with respect to the Board Ac-
count.4°
34. MINN. STAT. § 298.22 (1994) (emphasis added).
35. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 416-B (July 11, 1949).
36. MINN. STAT. § 298.22 (1994) (emphasis added).
37. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 463 (College ed.
1968).
38. There is no legislative history on the 1995 amendments, indicating that
these changes were made in conference committee without hearings.
39. Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 223, art. 2, § 42, 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1205
(West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 298.22).
40. A second redundancy in section 298.22, subd. 2, creates another interpre-
tation issue. Note that "expenditures and projects" appears twice, the first time
modified by the adjective "all," and the second time modified by the clause "for
1210 [Vol. 25
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The statutory language creates confusion regarding some ma-
jor issues of governance. For example, the language itself does not
provide the Board with the explicit authority to approve, disapprove,
or modify the Commissioner's proposed fiscal year operating budget
or the Commissioner's spending plans. The question is whether a
budget is an "expenditure." In common understanding, a budget
is not viewed as an actual expenditure, but rather anticipated reve-
nues and expenses that may or may not come to fruition during the
course of the year. There are a number of questions regarding the
method and manner by which the agency can be appropriately
administered and responsibly governed:
1. If the Board does not have the explicit authority to
disapprove, approve or modify the agency's annual
operating budget, is its vote on the operating budget
then only a recommendation?
If so:
a. Does the Commissioner possess the authority to
disregard the Board's directive and/or perhaps
not even submit the budget for consideration
every year?
b. If the Commissioner implements the proposed
agency budget, and if the statute requires that all
actual expenditures and projects (but not budg-
ets) be approved by the Board, must an official,
public Board meeting be held to approve every
expenditure when the final decision is made to
commit the funds?
2. Alternatively, if the Board does pass a budget and
proposed spending plan, is that enough to provide
the required legal approval for each specific, line-
item expenditure as it is realized throughout the fis-
cal year? If so, if the Commissioner elects to spend
rehabilitation purposes as provided by this section." MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 2
(1998) (emphasis added). Subdivision 1(3) of section 298.22 grants the Commis-
sioner the power to "use whatever amounts of the appropriation ... that are de-
termined to be necessary and proper in the development of the remaining re-
sources of the county and in the vocational training and rehabilitation of its
residents .... " Id. § 292.22, subd. 3 (emphasis added). A possible interpretation
is that subdivision 2 grants the Board the power of approval only over expendi-
tures and projects for rehabilitation purposes, not over expenditures and projects
"necessary and proper in the development of the remaining resources of the
county and in the vocational training... of its residents." Id. § 292.22, subd. 2.
9
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resources beyond the specific limitation imposed by
the Board, must the Board hold an official public
meeting to approve every expenditure once the final
determination to expend those funds is made?
Another issue relates to the vague wording of the statute. For
instance, the terms "expenditure" and "project" are not defined. Is
a "project" any activity that is planned or is it just a major undertak-
ing? Or does it relate to how the agency staff has used the word for
accounting purposes to ensure certain programs are operationally
funded?
However the above ambiguities may be resolved, it is clear that
requiring prior board approval of all expenditures and projects by
a majority of the Board and the method, manner, and time of pay-
ments of all disbursements puts the Board in charge not just of the
overall direction and policy of the agency with respect to the Board
Account but also of major elements of the operational manage-
ment of the agency on these matters. The Board, in fact, interprets
the statute to give it both policy and substantial operational control
of the agency. The Board chair and other Board members some-
times direct staff without approval or knowledge of the Commis-
sioner. At the July 1997 Board meeting, the Board passed a budget
that cut a number of programs out of the Commissioner's budget.
The Board directed that, for virtually any spending, the Commis-
sioner either bring the matter to the Board for approval or get per-
sonal approval from a named senator or representative.41
2. The Environmental Fund Account I
Section 298.223 provides that this fund "shall be administered
by the Commissioner."42 The Commissioner shall submit projects
to be funded to the Board.43  Upon approval of the majority of
members of the Board, the projects shall be submitted to the Gov-
ernor, who shall approve or disapprove, or return for further con-
sideration each project." In addition, "funds for a project may be
expended only upon approval of the project by the board and gov-
41. Memorandum from Jim Gustafson, Commissioner, to Doug Gregor, Assis-
tant Attorney General (Oct. 28, 1997) (on file with the author).
42. MINN. STAT. § 298.223, subd. 2 (1998).
43. See id.
44. See id.
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ernor."45 This governance structure gives the Board co-equal power
with the Governor over the account to determine which projects
are to be funded. The meaning of the sentence, "Funds for a proj-
ect may be expended only upon approval of the project by the
board and governor," is not clear. It appears that the governance
structure of this account may be similar to the Board Account,
where the decision to approve a project is distinguished from the
decision to disburse the money for the project. Both decisions re-
quire prior board approval in the Board Account. If this sentence
just means that funds may be disbursed whenever the Board and
Governor approve the project, it seems redundant since the statute
already requires that the Board and Governor approve all projects.
The most reasonable interpretation of the sentence is that the
Board and Governor have co-equal power to decide on disburse-
ment of funds for approved projects.
3. The Environmental Fund Account II
Section 298.2961 creates this fund as a special account in the
taconite environmental protection fund ("Environmental Fund Ac-
count I"). So presumably, as with that account, the fund shall be
administered by the Commissioner. Section 298.2961, subd. 2 also
provides, "To be proposed by the board, a project must be ap-
proved by at least eight.., board members."46 The second sen-
tence provides, "The money for a project may be spent only upon
approval of the project by the governor."47 The third sentence re-
quires that the Board "may submit supplemental projects for ap-
proval at any time."4
The meaning of the second sentence is not clear. If section
298.2961 is structured similarly to the Board Account and the Envi-
ronmental Account Fund I, then the Board has sole power to ap-
prove a project, but the Governor has sole power to approve the
disbursement of funds for the project. However, the first sentence
begins, "To be proposed by the board ..... " and the third sentence
refers to board submission of projects "for approval," which must
45. Id. Prior to 1995, the Board made recommendations to the governor re-
garding projects. See MINN. STAT. § 298.223, subd. 2 (1994). The 1995 legislation
required projects to be approved by at least eight votes of the Board. See MINN.
STAT. § 298.223, subd. 2 (1996).
46. MINN. STAT. § 298.2961, subd. 2 (1998).
47. Id.
48. Id.
11
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mean to be proposed or submitted for approval to the Governor.
It seems most reasonable to interpret the governance structure
for this account in light of the governance structure of other ac-
counts. The Board and Governor share co-equal power to deter-
mine what projects are to be undertaken, and the Governor has the
power to decide on disbursement of funds for approved projects.
4. The Economic Development Fund Account I
Section 298.227 directs the Board to release funds for each
producer on the written authorization by majority vote of a joint
committee of representatives of salaried and non-salaried employ-
ees of that producer.49
5. The Economic Development Fund Account II
Section 298.2213, subd. 1 directs an appropriation from the
general fund "to the commissioner." 0 Section 298.2213, subd. 4
provides:
To be proposed by the board, a project must be approved
by at least eight.., board members and the commis-
sioner .... The list of projects must be submitted to the
governor who shall... approve, disapprove, or return for
further consideration, each project. The money for a pro-
ject may be spent only upon approval of the project by the
governor.
The 1999 amendments changed the necessary vote for ap-
proval of a project to a majority of the board.52
The governance structure of this account requires that the de-
cision to undertake a project must have the approval of a majority
of the Board, the Commissioner, and the Governor. All three have
co-equal powers to approve projects for this account. The meaning
of the third sentence regarding disbursement of money for a proj-
ect only upon approval of the Governor is unclear. In light of the
governance structure of other accounts, it seems most reasonable
that only the Governor has power to approve the disbursement of
49. See id. § 298.227.
50. Id. § 298.2213, subd. 1.
51. Id. § 298.2213, subd. 4.
52. See Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 223, art. 2, § 42, 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1205 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 298.22).
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funds for a project.
6. The Economic Protection Trust Account
Section 298.296, subd. 3 states that the Commissioner shall
administer the program under which funds are expended out of
this account.53 However, section 298.296, subd. 1 grants the Board
the power to "prepare a list of projects to be funded" from the ac-
count and further provides:
To be proposed by the board, a project must be approved
by at least eight.., board members and the commis-
sioner.... The list of projects shall be submitted to the
governor, who shall.., approve or disapprove, or return
for further consideration, each project. The money for a
project may be expended only upon approval of the proj-
ect by the governor.
54
The governance structure for this account is similar to that of
the Economic Development Fund Account II.
B. Is the Board Part of the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch?
Executive power consists of interpreting and implementing or
enforcing laws enacted by the legislature.55 This power includes de-
termining budgetary calculations. 56 The United States Supreme
Court has also found that executive power includes controlling the
management of a government owned corporation.5 7 The Office of
the Commissioner, including all employees, is clearly an agency in
the executive branch under traditional definitions and those con-
tained in Minnesota Statutes sections 298.22, subd. 1 and 15.06,
subd. 1. 58 What is the Board? Minnesota Statutes section 15.012
53. See MINN. STAT. § 298.296, subd. 3 (1998).
54. Id. § 298.296, subd. 1 (emphasis added).
55. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986); See also State ex rel. Univ. of
Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 265, 220 N.W. 951, 954 (1928).
56. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733.
57. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
58. See MINN. STAT. §§ 298.22, subd. 1; 15.06, subd. 1 (1998). See also MINN.
STAT. § 43A.02, subd. 22 (1998) (defining the "executive branch" to include all
employees of the Board for purposes of the statutes relating to the Department of
Employee Relations). Minnesota Statutes section 116J.871 defines "state agency"
to include the Board for purposes of the statutes relating to the Department of
Trade and Economic Development. See id. § 116J.871 (1998).
13
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defines types of state agencies to include the following:
(a) An agency in the executive branch ... whose primary
purpose is to perform prescribed official or representative
functions shall be designated a "board." To be classified
as a board, an agency must have at least one of the follow-
ing powers:
(i) the power to perform administrative acts, which
may include the expenditure of state money;
(ii) the power to issue and revoke licenses or certifi-
cations;
(iii) the power to make rules; or
(iv) the power to adjudicate contested cases or ap-
peals.
(d) An agency in the legislative branch composed exclu-
sively of members of the legislature shall be designated a
"legislative commission."59
The Board clearly exercises executive power and performs
administrative acts, including the approval of projects and expendi-
tures in the Board's major accounts. It also cannot be a legislative
commission because the three nonlegislators are members.
6
0
Therefore, the IRRR Board is an agency in the executive branch.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER TO
LEGISLATORS
A. GeneralAnalysis
The Constitutional issues relate to the 1995 legislative
amendments to the enabling legislation and the make-up of IRRR
Board membership, which combine to provide the Board, consist-
ing of ten legislators and three non-legislators, the explicit author-
59. MINN. STAT. § 15.012 (1998).
60. The Board has far broader management responsibilities than other legis-
lative commissions. Those commissions have power only to review executive deci-
sions by gathering information and holding hearings, and to make recommenda-
tions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 3.887 (1998) (for the Legislative Water Commission);
MINN. STAT. § 3.85 (1998) (for the Legislative Commission on Pensions and Re-
tirement).
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ity to administer an executive branch agency. The composition of
the IRRR Board, coupled with the specifically enumerated author-
ity provided the IRRR Board, creates an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion of the powers exclusively reserved in the Minnesota State Con-
stitution to the executive branch of government.
Earlier analysis in Part II.B established that the Office of the
Commissioner of Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation is
clearly an agency of the executive branch. The IRRR Board, com-
posed of ten legislators and the three nonlegislators, is an anomaly
in state government. Unlike other boards, the IRRR Board is the
only state board with any significant power that is composed almost
entirely of legislators. While there are other very minor state
boards with legislators as members, the legislators are far outnum-
bered by other appointed officials and the boards are advisory.'
Under Minnesota Statutes section 15.012, the IRRR Board is
62classified as a "board" within the executive branch . However, re-
gardless of how the Board is classified under section 15.012, it has
statutorily granted powers requiring its approval for all expendi-
tures and projects made by the Commissioner. Members of the leg-
islative branch are granted and are exercising substantial IRRR ex-
ecutive branch power and authority.
63
Article III of the Minnesota State Constitution states that "The
powers of government shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons be-
longing to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise
any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others .... "6
In addition, Article V delineates, in part, the authority of the Gov-
ernor, by stating the Governor... "with the advice and consent of
the Senate,... may appoint other officers provided by law .... He
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 6
The composition of the Board (and the corresponding exer-
61. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 138.763 (1998) (creating St. Anthony Falls Heri-
tage Board with four of the 22 members coming from the house of representatives
and the senate); MINN. STAT. § 15.50 (1998) (creating the Capitol Area Architec-
tural Planning Board with two of the eight members coming from the house of
representatives and the senate).
62. See id. § 15.012, subd. 2.
63. Even if the IRRR Board is found to be exercising legislative rather than
executive power, the arrangement would still violate the Presentment Clause of
the Minnesota Constitution, providing that "Every bill.., shall be presented to the
governor." MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23.
64. Id. art. III,§ 1.
65. Id. art. V, § 3.
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cise of the Board's statutorily-prescribed authority) violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The Minnesota
Constitution states, in part, that "No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers prop-
erly belonging to either of the others ....,,6 As noted earlier, over the
years the legislature modified portions of chapter 298 to require
that the Commissioner submit all projects and expenditures to a
Board comprised of almost exclusively legislators (who collectively
can control the outcome of any vote) for their approval.6' Neither
the Commissioner nor the Governor can override their decision.68
The Board now has substantial control over all administration of
the agency.
Furthermore, the current legislative membership has signifi-
cantly exercised the powers conferred upon the Board. For in-
stance, since 1995 these legislative branch officials have interpreted
the statute to give them both policy and operational control of the
agency. 69 The Chair and other Board members sometimes direct
staff without approval or knowledge of the Commissioner. The
Board has passed budgets that cut a number of programs out of the
Commissioner's budget. The Board has directed that, for virtually
any spending, the Commissioner bring the matter to the Board for
approval or get personal approval from a named senator or repre-• 70
sentative. They have, in practice and effect, been operating as
agency administrators and exercising authority traditionally re-
served for the executive branch. In other words, the Governor, act-
ing through his Commissioner, has little actual authority over the
approval of projects and the expenditure of agency funds; actual
and practical control has been substantially transferred to a board
of legislators. This detailed involvement in administrative decision-
making over a state agency by a board comprised of ten legislators
(and three non-legislators) is a direct usurpation of executive
branch powers. The statutorily mandated super-majority require-
ment for some of the accounts further strengthens the separation
of powers argument. Because all expenditures and projects in sig-
nificant accounts must be approved by an eight-vote majority of the
66. Id. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
67. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 2 (1998).
68. See id.
69. See Memorandum from Jim Gustafson, Commissioner, to Doug Gregor,
Assistant Attorney General, Minutes, IRRR Board Meeting, July 8, 1997 (Oct. 28,
1997) (on file with the author).
70. See id.
1218 [Vol. 25
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/6
1999] IRON RANGE RESOURCES AND REHABILITATION BOARD 1219
Board, even more power has been transferred from the executive
branch to the legislative branch.
The major argument of IRRR Board members supporting the
current governance structure is that the Board is purely advisory to
the Governor, who makes all final decisions. This argument is sim-
ply not what the statute says. The Board has final power over the
Board Account, and co-equal, not advisory, power with the Gover-
nor on the other accounts. The Governor cannot act to execute
the laws without Board approval. Moreover, the Board had advi-
sory power prior to the 1995 amendments. Clearly, the 1995
amendments direct the Board to exercise control.
When the Board imposed strict limits on the Commissioner's
executive branch discretionary authority, it also interfered with the
Governor's Constitutional responsibility under Article V to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed., 71 Minnesota Statutes
chapter 298 states that before the Commissioner can expend any
resources, the Commissioner first must obtain the approval of the
Board (ten of whom are elected legislators appointed by legislative
branch leadership) . Under the statute, the Board, comprised al-
most solely of legislators, could vote to withhold the approval of
expenditures necessary to comply with the law.73 Consequently, the
Governor could not take any appropriate action to ensure that he
fulfills his constitutional oath to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed."
74
The strength of the separation of powers doctrine in the Min-
nesota Constitution is buttressed further by Article IV, Section 5.
Article IV, Section 5 provides, "No senator or representative shall
hold any other office under the authority of the United States or
the state of Minnesota, except that of post-master or notary pub-
lic." 75 From the language used, it is clear that the service as a sena-
tor or representative is "an office" meaning a position of duty, trust
or authority, or a position as an official. In examining whether a
legislator holds a disqualifying office, the courts will look at
whether the person has independent authority under the law, ei-
ther alone or with others of equal authority, to determine public
policy or to make a formal decision not generally subject to super-
71. MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3.
72. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 2.
73. See id.
74. MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3.
75. Id. art. IV, § 5.
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visory approval.16 The two specific exceptions, "the office" of post-
master and "the office" of notary public, are low-level appoint-
ments. This indicates how broadly the constitutional language was
intended to sweep. Even a notary public holds "an office." The
constitutional language and its interpretations prohibit a legislator
from serving in any position of duty, trust, or authority or position
as an official in the executive branch except postmaster or notary
public.77 Membership on the Board is clearly an "office" under the
authority of the state, as the acts of its members are not generally
subject to supervision. Joint service as a legislator and as a member
of the IRRR Board making executive decisions violates the "incom-
patible offices" provisions of the Minnesota Constitution.
B. Separation of Powers
The Minnesota and United States Constitutions have similar
separation of powers doctrines, and both support the conclusion
that the IRRR Board's composition is unconstitutional. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court has not decided a case where the legislature
has delegated executive power to agents of the legislature; however,
the court has defended the separation of powers in a number of
cases.
In State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, the Governor,
through the Commission of Administration and Finance-created
by an act of the legislature to centralize administrative responsibil-
ity in the Governor-claimed authority to supervise and control the
making of contracts and the expenditure of all moneys by the Uni-
versity. 9 The court found, "The right to control University finances
is the power to dictate academic policy and direct every institu-
tional activity."80 The constitutional issue was whether this claim of
power over the University violated Article 8, Section 4 of the Min-
nesota Constitution, providing, "All the rights, immunities, fran-
76. See McCutcheon v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 443, 446, 216 N.W.2d 137,
139 (1974).
77. See Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 28-B-1 (Sept. 22, 1948) (serving as a legislator
and railroad and warehouse commissioner violates the "incompatible offices" pro-
vision); Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. No. 302, 265(1930) (member of legislature is not
eligible to appointment as member of civil service board); Op. Minn. Att'y Gen.
280-H (Mar. 3, 1939) (member of legislature cannot be member of school board);
Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 280-H (Dec. 19, 1950) (member of legislature cannot be
member of retirement board).
78. 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928).
79. See id. at 260, 220 N.W. at 952.
80. Id. at 260, 220 N.W. at 952.
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chises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred are
hereby perpetuated unto the University.... 8  The court noted
that a corporation had been created in 1851, and was "perpetu-
ated" by the Constitution in 1858 with "all the rights, immunities,
franchises and endowments" which it then possessed.8 2 "Of that
corporation the regents were both the sole members and the gov-
erning board."83 "So the University, in respect of its corporate
status and government, was put beyond the power of the Legisla-
ture by paramount law .... 84
The court found that the Minnesota Constitution meant that
"...the whole executive power of the University having been put in
the regents by the people, no part of it can be exercised or put elsewhere
by the Legislature."85 The court noted that:
Generally, the distinction between the jurisdiction of the
Legislature and that of the regents is that between legisla-
tive and executive power. Legislative power, as distin-
guished from executive power, is the authority to make
the laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents
charged with the duty of such enforcement. 
6
In Holmberg v. Holmber 87 a case decided January 28, 1999, the
Minnesota Supreme Court again defended the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The doctrine is based on the principle that when
the government's power is concentrated in one of its branches, tyr-
anny and corruption will result.8 The case presented the issue
whether the administrative child support process created by the
legislature violated the separation of powers doctrine by infringing
upon the original jurisdiction of the district court. 9 The court,
looking at Article VI of the Minnesota Constitution giving the dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction in all court and criminal cases, de-
termined that, "With the creation of the administrative process, the
legislature has delegated to an executive agency the district court's
inherent equitable power. This delegation infringes on the district
81. MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
82. Chase, 175 Minn. at 259, 220 N.W. at 951.
83. Id. at 265, 220 N.W. at 954.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999).
88. See id. at 723.
89. See id. at 725-26.
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court's original jurisdiction."90
In Irwin v. Surdyks Liquor,91 a case decided September 6, 1999,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to vigor-
ously defend the separation of powers doctrine. 2 The court, look-
ing at Article III of the Minnesota Constitution, concluded that the
attorney fee provisions in the Worker's Compensation Act in-
fringed upon the court's inherent power to oversee attorneys and
attorney fees and therefore were unconstitutional.9 The separation
of powers themes found in Minnesota law are consistent with how
the federal courts have addressed separation of powers issues.
Since the inception of our nation, the separation of powers has
been an important consideration, especially with regard to over-
reaching by the legislative branch:
The legislative department derives a superiority in our
governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional
powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible
of precise limits, it can with the greater facility, mask un-
der complicated and indirect measures, the encroach-
ments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. It
is not unfrequently a question of real-nicety in legislative
bodies, whether the operation of a particular measure,
will, or will not extend beyond the legislative sphere.94
The Constitution of the United States provides the basic out-
line for how our federal government is to operate. It defines three
branches of government, and vests specific powers in each of these
branches.99 This division of power was instituted to prevent one
branch from becoming too powerful.96 The doctrine of separation
90. Id.
91. 599 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1999).
92. See id. at 13742.
93. See id. at 142.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States .... ); Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The Execu-
tive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); Id. art.
III, § 1, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
96. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed.,
1961). "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self ap-
pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Id.
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of powers prohibits the legislative branch, either direcdy or
through its agents, from exercising executive power.97
Although Minnesota courts have not decided cases where the
legislature has delegated executive power to its agents, the United
States Supreme Court has decided such a case. In Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc. ("Washington Airports"),98 the Court found unconstitu-
tional a delegation of executive power to legislators that is almost
identical to the executive power delegated to the IRRR Boardi9
Congress established an airport authority for the two major
airports in the Washington, D.C. area, Dulles Airport and National
Airport.' °° Congress created a Metropolitan Washington Airport
Authority ("MWAA"), which in turn was to create a Board of Re-
view, consisting of nine members of Congress who served on the
various transportation committees.'0 ' Congress required the
Authority to submit a number of decisions to the Board for ap-
proval, including the adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds,
promulgation of regulations, endorsement of a master plan, and
the appointment of the chief executive officer. 0 2 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia held that "the Board was in es-
sence a congressional agent with disapproval powers over key op-
erational decisions that were quintessentially executive, and
therefore violated the separation of powers.
" 3
The Supreme Court affirmed thejudgment of the court of ap-
peals, noting that the Constitution contains two elemental re-
straints on Congress: first, that it may not invest itself or its mem-
bers with either executive power or judicial power; and second,
when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedures specified in
Article 1.104 In discussing the first constraint, the Court cited the its
earlier decisions in Springer v. Philippine Islands °5 and Bowsher v.
97. SeeBowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
98. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
99. See id. at 255.
100. See id. at 260.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 259.
103. Id. at 263.
104. See id. at 274 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.919, 951 (1983)).
105. 277 U.S. 189 (1928). Springer is also cited by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 267, 220 N.W.
951, 954 (1928).
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In Springer, plaintiffs challenged the validity of acts of the Phil-
ippine Legislature that authorized a committee of three-two legis-
lators and one executive-to vote corporate stock owned by the
Philippine Government."7 Because the statute authorized two leg-
islators to perform the executive function of controlling the man-
agement of the government-owned corporations, the Court held
the statutes invalid. 10 8
A similar result was reached in Bowsher, where the Court dis-
cussed the validity of a delegation of authority to the Comptroller
General to revise the federal budget.'0 After concluding that the
Comptroller General was an agent of Congress, the Court held that
he could not exercise executive powers."0 As the Bowsher Court
stated:
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an of-
ficer answerable only to Congress would, in practical
terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of
the laws .... The structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Con-
gress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it
does not possess .... 11'
The Washington Airports Court applied the standards of Springer
and Bowsher and concluded that Congress had invested itself with• 112
executive power.
In addressing the second constraint-that when Congress ex-
ercises its legislative power it must follow Article I procedures-the
Washington Airports Court cited its decision in INS v. Chadha.1
3
Chadha involved the validity of a statute that authorized either
house of Congress by resolution to invalidate a decision by the At-
torney General to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United
States." 4 The Court struck down the statute, holding that Congress
106. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
107. See Springr, 277 U.S. at 198.
108. See id. at 209.
109. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714.
110. See id.
111. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Air-
craft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726).
112. Seeid. at255.
113. See id. at 259 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 959 (1983)).
114. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
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cannot exercise its legislative power to enact laws without following
the bicameral and presentment procedures specified in Article ."
Applying the principles set forth in Springer, Bowsher, and
Chadha, the Washington Airports court held that the Board of Re-
view's power was constitutionally impermissible:
... If the power is executive, the Constitution does not
permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is
legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with
the bicameralism and presentment requirements .... In
short, when Congress "[takes] action that ha[s] the pur-
pose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and re-
lations of persons... outside the Legislative Branch," it
must take that action by the procedures authorized in the
Constitution.
One might argue that the provision for a Board of Re-
view is the kind of practical accommodation between the
Legislature and the Executive that should be permitted in
a "workable government." Admittedly, Congress imposed
its will on the regional authority created by the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia by means
that are unique and that might prove to be innocuous.
However, the statutory scheme.., provides a blueprint
for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its
constitutionally confined role ... . Congress could, if this
Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to en-
able its Members or its agents to retain control, outside
the ordinary legislative process or the activities of state
grant recipients charged with executing virtually every as-
pect of national policy .... Legislative "power is of an en-
croaching nature,"... [and] the Board of Review is an
impermissible encroachment.1
6
The Washington Airports decision relies on the elemental tenets
of American democracy shared by Minnesota. "Legislative
power.., is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or
appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement.
" 1"7
Or, as Chief Justice Marshall more generally observed: "It is the pe-
115. See id.
116. Id. at 276.
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (quoting Springer, 277 U.S. at
189); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 264, 220 N.W. 951, 954
(1928) (quoting Springer, 277 U.S. at 189).
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culiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals
in society would seem to be the duty of other departments."
1 8
In sum, Congress may not intervene in the decision-making
necessary to execute the law." 9 "The structure of the Constitution
does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Con-
gress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not
possess." 20 Therefore, any scheme whereby Congress or the Min-
nesota Legislature-whether itself or through one of its commit-
tees, members, or agents-appoints, retains removal authority over,
or otherwise exercises any type of continuing authority over a
member of the executive branch violates the constitutional
anti-aggrandizement principle. The doctrine of separation of pow-
ers prohibits the Minnesota Legislature, either directly or indirectly
through its agent, from exercising executive power.
There is no question that the IRRR Board is an executive
agency, 21 and there is no question that it is composed nearly en-
tirely of legislators who have the final determination on Board de-
cisions. Clearly, from both the Minnesota and Federal cases, the
legislature has violated the separation of powers doctrine by dele-
gating executive powers to the IRRR Board, an agent of the legisla-
ture.
V. MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE IRRR BOARD AND
COMMISSIONER
A. Basic Principles of Governance for Entrepreneurial Government
Enterprises
Through the statutory objectives for the various accounts listed
in Part II above, the legislature has directed the Board and Com-
missioner to promote economic development, including tourism,
to create long-term employment, and to restore minelands in the
118. Fletcher v. Peck, (6 Cranch) 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810).
119. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986); See also FEC v. NRA Po-
litical Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), petition for cert. dismissed, 513 U.S.
88 (1994) (nonvoting ex officio members of Congress, by their presence alone on
an executive board, impermissibly influence an entity with executive powers).
120. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
121. Even if the power is legislative, the legislature must exercise it in confor-
mity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Minnesota Con-
stitution. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23.
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Taconite Tax Relief Area. 2  The first two elements of this mission
are highly entrepreneurial.
The Board and Commissioner are given broad commercial
powers to accomplish this entrepreneurial mission. For example,
Minnesota Statutes section 298.22 dealing with the Board Account
provides that the Commissioner "may use whatever amounts of the
appropriation... that are determined to be necessary and proper
in the development of the remaining resources.., and in the voca-
tional training and rehabilitation of its residents." 23 Section 298.22
further grants the Commissioner specific powers to acquire real es-
tate and personal property by purchase or lease, 12 to lease property
to others' 25 and, with respect to Giants Ridge recreation area, to
acquire by purchase or lease real and personal property as well as
to establish and participate in charitable foundations and nonprofit
corporations. 126 The Board is given the power to acquire an equity
interest in any project for which it provides funding. 2 7 The Board
is similarly granted power to acquire an equity interest in projects
in the Environmental Fund Account 11.128 The Board and the
Commissioner are granted power to provide "loans, loan guaran-
tees, interest buy-downs and other forms of participation with pri-
vate sources of financing. .. " in Economic Development Fund Ac-
count 11.129 The legislature grants the same powers to the
Commissioner and Board with respect to the Economic Protection
Trust Account plus the power to invest in a venture capital fund or
enterprise.
The combination of an entrepreneurial mission as a public in-
vestment banker and venture capitalist and substantial commercial
powers to carry out the mission makes clear that the Board and
Commissioner are, in effect, a form of government enterprise. The
Board and Commissioner are clothed with the power of govern-
ment but possessed of many of the powers of a private financial en-
terprise. Essentially, the legislature has directed the Board and
Commissioner to promote economic development and create long-
122. See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
123. MINN. STAT. § 298.22, subd. 1 (1998).
124. See id. § 298.22, subd. 3.
125. See id. § 298.22, subd. 5.
126. See id. § 298.22, subd. 7.
127. See id. § 298.22, subd. 6.
128. See id. § 298.2961, subd. 2.
129. Id. § 298.2213, subd. 3.
130. See id. § 298.292.
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term employment in the Taconite Tax Relief Area by making the
most cost effective or efficient investments and loans that achieve
the objectives.
There is a literature on government enterprise. The oldest le-
gal form for operating a government enterprise is a government
department proper or a subdivision of a government department.
Under this legal structure, direct responsibility on all matters de-
volves on the director of the department and ultimately on the
chief executive of the government. Personnel are subject to civil
service regulation. The enterprise is financed by annual appropria-
tions and is subject to the budget, accounting, and audit controls
applicable to other government activities. The department has the
sovereign immunity of the state.
A second alternative, the public corporation form, is not a
government department because it has its own board of directors
and accounts and the capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate
name. Except for appropriations to provide capital or to cover
losses, a public corporation is usually independently financed and
is not subject to the budget, accounting, or audit procedures appli-
cable to government departments.
A brief analysis of information costs and the need for flexibility
in business decisions will assist in laying the foundation for a dis-
cussion of both forms. It seems clear that in everyday life there is
an opportunity cost to the gaining of information; this is called an
information cost. It also seems clear that perfect information does
not exist; that is, no one knows a priori how to attain government
policies at an absolute minimum cost. However, it is plausible to
assume that the closer a decision-maker is to the market, the lower
the information costs of the data necessary for a decision. The pre-
cise relationship of information costs and bureaucratic structure
will depend on the characteristics of the industry and the regula-
tory mechanism utilized, but in general, decisions made further
from the market will suffer from informational poverty. Because of
the information loss that accompanies the transmission of informa-
tion and judgments from lower levels of the hierarchy to higher
levels, the ultimate basis of a decision may be misleading at best
and erroneous at worst.
It also seems plausible to assume that the closer the decision-
maker is to the market (all other things being equal), the more re-
sponsive to changing market conditions the decision-maker will be.
Decisions made further from the market will suffer from response
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lag.
It is axiomatic that business conditions change continually and
rapidly and that both informational poverty and response lag lead
to lost opportunities and higher costs. Underscoring the problem
of informational poverty, Professor William Baumol observes:
[I]n a changing world there is much force to the argu-
ment that the manager of some business enterprise will
generally be better informed than a government repre-
sentative as to the requirements for the efficient operation
of his plant .... The operation of any particular firm can
rarely be mastered by proxy, and this is especially likely to
be true where one attempts to operate many undertakings
simultaneously which vary in detail.' 31
As for responsiveness, business institutions must be able to ad-
just quickly to changing conditions in order to survive.
Problems of informational poverty and response lag are evi-
dent in department-form enterprises, where efficient resource al-
location is rendered problematic. Serious shortcomings of de-
partments are both the failure to get correct information and act
on it and the lack of flexibility necessary to give initiative and en-
terprise full reign.
An even more serious shortcoming of departments is their im-
perviousness to changing conditions because of red tape and bu-
reaucracy. This lack of responsiveness was noted by Professor John
Thurston, who commented:
[A] government department is notoriously poor at adap-
tation. Hampered by partisan control, operating on a
fixed yearly budget, bound by rigid rules governing its
purchases, accounting, expenditures, and personnel, un-
able to borrow on its own responsibility to provide for new
capital equipment or to expand working capital quickly,
embarrassed by immunity from suit and other legal rules
affording special privileges to the government which de-
stroy commercial confidence and make it impossible to
carry on business in accordance with the usual commer-
cial practice, the government department is a sorry failure
131. WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
159-60 (1952).
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as an entrepreneur.132
Rigid rules for the purchase of supplies, placing of contracts,
and promotion of personnel are examples of stipulations inherent
in government-department activity. These rules conflict with ac-
cepted commercial practices and hamper response to the market.
As an early United Nations report notes, it is theoretically pos-
sible to endow a government department with a high degree of op-
erating flexibility, but in practice it is difficult to do so. 13 3 "As long
as an enterprise is not clearly differentiated from other types of
governmental activity, strong pressures will be brought to make it
conform to standard government regulations and procedures
,134
This leaves the public corporation form. The autonomy from
government control implicit in this form is intended to address the
problems of informational poverty and response lag apparent in
the department form. The key question concerns governance of
these corporations. What is the optimal mechanism for definition
of policy and operating objectives and assurance of efficiency? A
1995 congressional report states that a major challenge remains for
government corporations: how can these corporations "be held po-
litically accountable for their policies and operations while still be-
ing assigned the necessary financial and administrative discretion
to function in a commercial manner?
1 35
In the United States, events have moved more quickly than
theory, and public corporations have been regularly created to
meet crises. Guided by an unreasoned faith in autonomy from fis-
cal controls as the cure-all for the defects of the department form,
policymakers in the United States have given cursory attention to
corporate governance. The Tax Foundation in 1955 observed that
"the only common characteristic that emerges from the history of
government corporations is the quest for freedom from the usual
government fiscal controls and procedures. The corporate struc-
132. JOHN THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH
SPEAKING COUNTRIES 7 (1937).
133. See UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SOME
PROBLEMS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN THE
INDUSTRIAL FIELD 8 (1954).
134. Id.
135. RONALD C. MOE, MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS ix (Apr. 1995) (report prepared for the Senate Governmental Af-
fairs Committee).
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ture provided the sought-after autonomy in budgeting, record-
keeping and procedural matters., 136 Even today, there is little con-
sensus on the most appropriate internal and legal characteristics of
a public corporation.
1 3 7
Among the few giving thoughtful attention to the governance
question, Thurston posited in 1937 that the defects of the depart-
ment form could be remedied by a public corporation that could
be "protected to the greatest possible extent from partisan interfer-
ence while yet subject to an appropriate degree of public control on mat-
ters of broad policy. The device of a corporation, if properly ap-
plied, gives both independence and flexibility without sacrificing or
endangering the public interest."
3 8
Thurston addressed directly the question of corporate govern-
ance in an attempt to define "an appropriate degree of control."
He explained that the day-to-day administration of the corporation
should be independent of the executive and the legislature, but
"[iln matters of general and public policy, the corporation must
necessarily be subject to executive and legislative control."'3 9 In ad-
dition to having control over "general and public policy," the ex-
ecutive and legislature also should monitor the efficiency of the
public corporation. However, Thurston perceived a dilemma in
balancing the need "to ensure that the corporation functions effi-
ciently and without waste," and the problem of "preventing unnec-
essary interference with details of administration."' 4
Thurston identified government control of policy, manage-
ment autonomy in operations, and the assurance of efficiency as
the principal elements in the corporate-governance question, but
his attempt to delineate a corporate-governance control mecha-
nism failed because of his initial simplifying assumption. Thurston
believed there are few policy questions left for the corporation be-
cause they are answered by the enabling legislation. As he stated,
"The major question of policy was decided when it was determined
to establish the corporation, and most problems thereafter are
problems of management.... Indeed, once the corporation is es-
tablished there are surprisingly few questions of policy remaining
136. THE TAX FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 6
(1955).
137. See MOE, supra note 135, at xii-xiii.
138. THURSTON, supra note 132, at 8 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 258.
140. Id. at 216-17.
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,,141
Implicit in this statement is the assumption that the board is
essentially performing ministerial functions in carrying out the leg-
islative policies, and the definition of policy is a minimal problem.
This ignores the considerable policymaking discretion implicit in
the delegation of authority to an agency to interpret legislation. In
the enabling legislation for many of the transit authorities analyzed
in my book, Governance of Public Enterprise,"2 for example, legislative
purposes were outlined with an extremely broad brush, leaving the
boards to make critical policy decisions on modes and services.
The lack of attention to issues of policy formation was a serious
shortcoming.
Having made the assumption that the board's role is essentially
ministerial, Thurston focused attention only on mechanisms for
the government to exercise a check on the performance of the
corporation. This he perceived as a problem of balancing efforts to
monitor performance with problems of unnecessary interference in
the details of administration.
Thurston posited that the principal control is in the power
granted to the executive branch to appoint and to remove direc-
tors.143 Another possible method of control is to have executive of-
ficers of the government serve as ex officio directors.14 Thurston
was concerned that this might lead to political interference and de-
stroy the independence of management.
145
Audit of the corporation's accounts was considered necessary
by Thurston to check for financial integrity and to determine if ex-
penditures were made as authorized by law, but the auditor was
only to report problems and not have power to disallow expendi-
tures, as is normal with audits of government departments.1' 6 It also
was believed preferable for the corporation to comply with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles and have an independent audi-
tor than to be bogged down in the restrictions on expenditure im-
posed on government departments.1
47
Thurston noted that corporate self-support was itself a consid-
141. Id. at 259.
142. NEIL HAMILTON & PETER HAMILTON, GovERNANcE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
(1981).
143. See THURSTON, supra note 132, at 217-18.
144. See id. at 219.
145. See id. at 156.
146. See id. at 232-34.
147. See id. at 235-36.
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erable check on management of government firms, but that a fur-
ther competitive spur was necessary.'" In order to ensure that
management was not wasteful, Thurston advocated that some plan
had to be devised to recapture the stimulus of competition or to
find a substitute for it.149 Uncertain how to accomplish this, he sug-
gested further study on the possibility of comparisons among gov-
ernment corporations and management audits by experts.
' 5°
The possibility of unnecessary government interference could
be held in check by granting financial autonomy to the corpora-
tion. Thurston believed this would be the most effective means of
minimizing political interference. 5
These relationships among government supervision, manage-
ment autonomy, and efficiency were unsatisfactorily defined by
Thurston. The critical relationship of competition and efficiency
was acknowledged but unresolved. Given no proposed substitute
for competition, it seems doubtful that power of appointment and
removal, audits, breakeven budget constraints, and corporate fi-
nancial autonomy will approximate efficiency.
The role of the board regarding governance of operating
management also was left almost totally undefined. Thurston
commented only that "[a] board, moreover, is needed to stand be-
tween the corporation and political forces in order to protect it
from popular and partisan demands."'52
Building on Thurston's work, I developed the public-
corporation form further in my 1981 book Governance of Public En-
terprise 15 The public corporation board must be politically ac-
countable for the formulation of a statement of policies reflecting
the overall goals that the legislature has set for the government en-
terprise. Since the attainment of lowest-cost production of the
goals is itself a critical goal, the board is also politically accountable
for implementing conditions that are necessary to realize lowest
costs in production. These conditions concern the articulation of
operating objectives and performance criteria, management
autonomy over operational decisions, and the introduction of pres-
sures to minimize costs.
148. See id. at 259.
149. See id. at 215-17.
150. See id. at 268.
151. See id. at 256-57.
152. Id. at 150.
153. HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 142.
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1. The Formulation of Objectives
Consider first the formulation of general policies and operat-
ing objectives. It is clear that lowest-cost production has meaning
only with relation to the type of output that is desired by the com-
munity. Without specific knowledge of the ends sought, manage-
ment will be confused, leading to waste of resources and a blind,
undirected transfer of income. To leave firms operating in uncer-
tainty between straight commercial objectives and a vague sense of
social responsibility is to invite both economic waste and inconsis-
tent social choices.
In my case studies of mass transit, a lack of objectives resulted
in a "management by crisis" approach to operating the firm. Re-
sponding only by way of "fire-fighting" problems on a last-minute
basis inevitably raises costs by preventing selection of low-cost alter-
natives that require developmental lead times. These poor results
attributable to inadequate policy formation may lead ironically to
the possibility of greater government involvement in day-to-day op-
erations.
Identically the same results follow from too many or too gen-
eralized objectives. "Laundry lists" of general policies, as were ob-
served in my transit case studies, may make policymakers feel good,
but are of no value in securing lowest-cost production. General
policies can provide little direction to, and no control over, man-
agement. Management can trade off objectives as it desires. Fur-
thermore, management cannot be expected to maximize more
than a few variables at one time.
A necessary condition for business accountability is therefore
to translate the statement of generalized policy necessary for politi-
cal accountability into clear and unconflicting objectives. The ob-
jectives must define the policies in operational terms. In transit,
for example, the movement of passengers, not empty seats, is the
output of a transit system that provides utility. For the IRRR Board
and Commissioner, it could be to maximum long-term private-
sector employment in the Taconite Tax Relief Area.
The mere statement of clear objectives at least directs man-
agement efforts but does not provide a basis to measure the ade-
quacy of management's performance. There also must be a means
by which to measure the relative degree of attainment of the objec-
tives. If objectives are defined without any method of measuring
performance, evaluation is also subjective and calls forth only the
minimum threshold effort that management believes will satisfy the
1234 [Vol. 25
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review. Objectives whose performance criteria define expected
performance levels in specific measurable terms would provide this
measurement capability. Criteria are essentially scaled operating
objectives. In transit, for example, achievement could be defined
by increases in the movement of handicapped. Transit efficiency is
thus the lowest-cost production satisfying any given level of a mobil-
ity objective.
The design of performance criteria that reinforce manage-
ment behavior leading to the fulfillment of the operating objectives
is a difficult task. These standards must take into account the en-
gineering and the social, political, and economic characteristics of
a government corporation and its environment. Extreme care
must be taken to monitor all criteria to prevent undesirable man-
agement response, since management, judged on the basis of the
criteria, will seek to satisfy the criteria without reference to the ob-
jectives.
Cost minimization therefore requires a few clear operating ob-
jectives and performance criteria. Simplicity is desirable, since the
fewer the policies and objectives, and the fewer the decisions in
implementation and supervision, the more likely the policy will ul-
timately be realized. Implicit in clarity is the caveat that the objec-
tives also must be consistent.
2. Management Autonomy
Assume that clear and consistent objectives and performance
criteria have been framed. Management autonomy is a second
critical condition for cost minimization. The board cannot work
out cost-minimizing production strategy. This requires full-time
work and inside knowledge of a business, its markets, its products,
and its technologies. Management is in the most informed position
to make resources productive in the pursuit of the enterprise's ob-
jectives. Stipulations dictated by the board lead to uninformed and
unresponsive production decisions and consequently to waste and
to lost opportunities. Therefore, if management lacks freedom to
follow its own production strategy in pursuing operating objectives,
it cannot be expected that lowest-cost production will be achieved.
3. Distinguishing Policy from Management Decisions
Underlying these simple conditions for business efficiency is a
conceptual problem, as yet unresolved, concerning the distinction
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between what is policy and what are operational or managerial de-
cisions. Even though the dichotomy between day-to-day operations
and policy determination is well recognized, it is not enough to say
only that broad policy decisions must be distinguished from opera-
tional decisions and then to rely solely on the public corporation
board's judgment to respect the distinction. With no clear theo-
retical distinction between policy and operating decisions, intracta-
ble practical problems are encountered in distinguishing the two.
The reason it is so difficult theoretically to distinguish policy
from managerial decisions is that in fact the two concepts are just
elements in a spectrum of decision-making ranging, for example,
from the most general questions concerning what service is to be
produced and for whom to specific questions concerning market-
ing, production, and finance. Realistically, there is no bright line
separating policy from operations. Policy, for instance, can be
framed as stipulations that limit management's role to minor ad-
ministrative decisions.
The lack of a bright line does not render the matter hopeless.
The attempts at lexical differentiation of policy and management
decisions rest on an awareness that as policymakers dictate increas-
ingly specific actions for management, there occurs a loss of both
managerial accountability, because management is not responsible
for decisions it does not make, and efficiency, because of both the
informational poverty of officials removed from the market and
their lack of flexibility and responsiveness in reacting to changing
market conditions. Since political accountability subsumes busi-
ness efficiency, policymakers are politically accountable for these
results. Thus it is clear that as policymakers move along a contin-
uum from allowing complete management autonomy to control-
ling completely all decisions, they are not trading business effi-
ciency for political accountability. Indeed when the detail with
which policy is articulated exceeds the minimum necessary to guide
management, the efficiency losses just mentioned occur without
any offsetting gains in welfare. Professor C. D. Drake observed, for
example, that the scale and frequency of ministerial intervention in
British public corporations grow without any corresponding in-
crease in political accountability.
54
The benefits of limiting policymaking to general guidance are
154. See C. D. Drake, The Public Corporation as an Organ of Government Policy, in
GovERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A CoMPARATIvE STUDY 26, 42 (W. G. Friedmann et al.
eds., 1970).
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clear, but the tendency toward the trivialization of political control
is strong. Professor William Robson noted that regardless of what
the legal texts say about powers, ministers in Britain gave little or
no guidance on questions of policy but did show an increasing ten-
dency to encroach on the details of management. 155 Similarly, in
some systems in my transit research, boards were loath to lay down
general policies but were eager to be involved in operational deci-
sions.
To reduce the inherent ambiguity in the definitions of policy
and operations and the risk of board interference in operations,
statutory guidelines must spell out the distinction. A clear defini-
tion of the areas of management autonomy could be incorporated
into the statutory language creating a public corporation. A possi-
ble approach would be to give management sole control over all
decisions that require detailed knowledge of the production and
market characteristics.
The grant of management autonomy in making production
decisions also finds support in an analysis of the model of govern-
ance for private corporations. In this model, the board of directors
theoretically makes policy and manages the firm, the executive of-
ficers are the agents of the board, and the shareholders elect the
board and decide major issues. Professor Melvin Eisenberg points
out that several factors seem relevant in addressing the question of
the scope of management discretion independent of shareholders'
approval within the model. First, the greater is the extent to which
the matter requires specifically business knowledge, the more likely
it is that the shareholders would want the decision to be made by
management. 11 Second, the greater is the economic significance
of the matter in terms of magnitude, risk, the time span of the ef-
fect, and the cost of reversal, the more likely it is that the share-
holders would want to make the decision. 157 Third, the more fre-
quent and routine is the matter, the more likely it is that
management should make the decision.58 Finally, the greater is
the need for speed, the more likely it is that management should
make the decision.
5 9
155. See WILLLAM ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRYAND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 79-80
(1960).
156. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF A CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 13 (1976).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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Taking these factors into account, Eisenberg constructs a
normative model of decision-making contemplated in state incor-
poration statutes by placing the kinds of decisions that arise into
four general categories: business decisions in the ordinary course,
business decisions out of the ordinary course, decisions involving
substantial change in the structure of the enterprise, and decisions
relating to the control apparatus of the entity in which the business
is enveloped. Several examples are used to clarify these catego-
ries. Business decisions in the ordinary course generally include hiring
161and firing, as well as selection of supplies and prices for materials.
These are management decisions. Examples of business decisions not
in the ordinary course are substantial expansion of plant capacity,
contracts for significant portions of a firm's output, or recognition
of a union.16 1 Shareholders through the board of directors, may
expect to exercise power over such actions or to direct that such ac-
tion be taken.16 Decisions involving substantial changes in the structure
of the enterprise, such as complete liquidation or sales of substantially
all the assets, are seen as essentially shareholder decisions, as are
decisions relating to the control apparatus, such as changes in share vot-
ing right or the number of directors.64
As noted in a later article by Eisenberg, the model does not
adequately describe reality.165 As a practical matter, as the number
of shareholders in a corporation increases, business complexity in-
creases and management makes all business decisions, whether in
or out of the ordinary course. 1 6 Moreover, it is not the board of di-
rectors that makes policy decisions and manages the firm, but
rather the executive officers. 67 In light of practical reality, Eisen-
berg concludes that the principal function of the board of directors
is to monitor the self-determined goals of the chief executive offi-
cer and his performance and to influence management through
the selection and removal of the chief executive . 6  "Those who
manage must be monitored to ensure that they are the right per-
160. See id.
161. See id. at 14.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 15.
165. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control 19
CARDOZO L. RiV. 237, 237 (1997).
166. See id. (explaining that boards are not able to manage because of their
limited investment of time, typically meeting only six to twelve times a year).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 238.
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sons for theirjobs, and that they are managing in the shareholders'
interests." 169 The monitoring model recognizes that evaluations
and decisions are shaped by the information available to the deci-
sion-maker, and for this reason, executives are in a better position
to make decisions.7 ° This "monitoring" model of corporate gov-
ernance is generally reflected in most modern corporation statutes,
usually providing something to the effect that "the business and af-
fairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board."'
17
The same divergence of theory and reality was observed in my
transit case studies. Executive officers of the systems were carrying
out both policymaking and management functions and had
coopted information flows and the evaluation process as well.
However, the lack of policy control is much more serious in a pub-
lic corporation, for unlike a private corporation, where there exists
a clear policy of profit-making, the policies to be pursued by a pub-
lic corporation relating to income redistribution, for example,
must be defined. The legislature and public corporation board
must do this. However, once policy is set, the same theoretical di-
chotomy of business decisions in the ordinary course as opposed to
extraordinary business decisions seen in the private-corporate gov-
ernance model could be put to advantage in the public corporation
model. The board, as representatives of the community, should
exercise approval power over such decisions. The board should
monitor decisions in the ordinary course on a spot-check basis, ask-
ing whether the process by which such decisions are made is sound.
Decisions involving substantial changes in the structure of the pub-
lic corporation or in the control apparatus should be referred to
the legislature for its approval.
This division of responsibilities between the public corporation
board and management clarifies to some degree the role of man-
agement and the role of the board in the regulatory process. A
simpler, more understandable structure should reduce information
costs incurred both by the board in monitoring management and
by the community in monitoring the board.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 245-46.
171. E.g., Revised MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.01(b) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(a) (1998); MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subd. 1 (1998).
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B. Summary of General Principles
1. In order to fulfill its mission, government enterprise
must be able to adjust quickly and flexibly to market
conditions using the best possible information.
2. The management of a government enterprise is both
substantially better informed about and responsive to
the market than government representatives.
3. The operating management of a government enter-
prise should be independent of the legislature and the
chief executive.
4. The government-department form of government en-
terprise fails to meet the above criteria. The public-
corporation form can achieve the criteria.
5. In the public-corporation form, the following princi-
ples apply.
a. The legislature should set forth with clarity the over-
all mission and governance structure of the public
corporation. The statute should spell out clearly the
distinction between board policy and management
operational responsibilities.
b. The public corporation board should formulate a
clear statement of policies reflecting the legislative
goals, as well as a few clear and unconflicting operat-
ing objectives and performance criteria.
c. Management should have autonomy over opera-
tional decisions. The board, lacking the necessary
information and quick responsiveness to the market,
cannot work out a cost-minimizing production strat-
egy.
d. Simplicity, clarity, and consistency are highly desir-
able throughout the governance structure to maxi-
mize the likelihood the legislative goals will ulti-
mately be realized.
C. Application of the Principles to the IRRR Board and Commissioner
Governance Structure
The legislature has directed the IRRR Board and Commis-
sioner essentially to make the most efficient investments and loans
to produce long-term private sector employment in the Taconite
1240 [Vol. 25
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Tax Relief Area.1' The IRRR Board and Commissioner are a type
of public investment banker and venture capitalist. Operational
decisions on investments and loans require a knowledge of business
management and finance.
The current governance structure of the IRRR Board and
Commissioner cannot achieve the mission the legislature has di-
rected. Operational management is substantially in the hands of
the IRRR Board, consisting of legislators who, unlike private corpo-
ration officers or even directors, do not have knowledge of market
conditions and who cannot adjust quickly and flexibly to changing
market conditions. The super-majority board decision rules for
some accounts mandated by statute substantially compound the
lack of quick and flexible operational response to the market. A
board consisting of legislators will politicize operational decisions,
ensuring that resources will be wasted.
The governance structure is not clear, understandable, simple,
or consistent. The legislature has created a number of major ac-
counts through which revenue flows to the IRRR Board and Com-
missioner.1" There is no consistency in the governance structure
among the accounts. For example, in each account, the legislature
apparently sought to separate the decision to undertake a project
from the decision to disburse the funds to pay the project. The leg-
islation sets forth four different models for these decisions
1. The Board Account Model74
a. The Commissioner is given the power to make nec-
essary and proper decisions to carry out the mission,
but the Board must approve all projects or expendi-
tures. 175
b. The Board must approve decisions as to method,
manner, and time of payment of all funds proposed
to be disbursed by a simple majority.
176
172. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22 (1998).
173. See id. §§ 298.22, .2213, .223, .296, .2961
174. See id. § 298.22.
175. See Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 223, art. 2, § 42, 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1205 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 298.22).
176. See MINN. STAT. § 298.22.
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2. The Environmental Fund Account f77
a. The Commissioner shall administer the fund but the
Board must approve all projects by a majority vote.
The Governor must also approve each project.
b. Funds may be expended only upon the approval of
the project by the Board and the Governor.
3. The Environmental Fund Account If 79
a. The Commissioner has power to administer the
fund but the Board must approve all projects by an
eight-vote super-majority vote. The Governor must
also approve each project.
b. Disbursements may be made on a project only after
approval by the Governor.8 °
4. The Economic Development Fund Account II and the Economic
Protection Trust Account T8
a. In the Economic Development Fund Account II, the
appropriation is to the Commissioner, and in the
Economic Protection Trust Account, the Commis-
sioner shall administer the program, but in both ac-
counts the Commissioner, the Board, and the Governor
must approve all projects. In the Economic Protec-
tion Trust Account, approval must be by an eight-
vote supermajority of the board.
b. Disbursements may be made on a project after ap-
proval by the Governor.
18
2
The current statutes creating a governance structure for the
IRRR Board and Commissioner are extremely poorly drafted and
confusing. There is substantial ambiguity and confusion regarding
allocation of responsibilities and lines of authority. The account-
ability of the Board and the Commissioner to the legislature, to the
Governor, and to the public is undermined.
177. See id. § 298.223.
178. See id.
179. See id. § 298.2961.
180. See id.
181. See id. §§ 298.2213, .296.
182. See id. §§ 298.2213, .296.
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VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL
IMPROVEMENTS BY THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
The current governance structure for the IRRR Board and
Commissioner both undermines the goals of the legislature and is
unconstitutional. The legislature should restructure the agency as
a public corporation with a board of directors and operating man-
agement following the principles of governance outlined in Parts
IV and V.
The Governor should appoint the IRRR Board of Directors
subject to senate confirmation. Legislators cannot serve on the
Board. The legislature can specify criteria for Board membership
and could create an appointment selection committee to recruit
and recommend candidates. The Governor could be required to
choose from the list of recommended candidates. The legislature
could create a legislative commission, consisting solely of legisla-
tors, to review agency decisions and to advise the legislature.
The legislature can be more specific in legislation regarding
the allocation of the appropriation to certain counties or areas.
This is a distribution of wealth question the legislature should re-
solve. However, policy and operational decisions on which invest-
ments or loans will maximize long-term private sector employment
in the Taconite Tax Relief Area should be delegated to the board
and management.
The legislature and Governor should act quickly to remedy the
unconstitutionality of the current governance structure. Uncer-
tainty concerning the constitutionality of the IRRR Board will un-
dermine the Board and the Commissioner in negotiations with so-
phisticated investors. Everyone can be certain that litigation will
eventually raise the constitutional issue.
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